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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
V.
)
NICHOLAS LEE STUDER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NOS. 47001-2019 & 47002-2019
GEM COUNTY NOS. CR-2016-447 &
NOS. CR-2016-1892
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Nicholas L. Studer admitted to violating his probation in two cases, the district
court revoked his probation and imposed his concurrent sentences of five years, with three years
fixed. Mr. Studer moved for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") in
both cases. The district court denied his motions, and Mr. Studer appeals. Mr. Studer argues that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motions.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In May 2016, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Studer with receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle, grand theft for possession of stolen property, possession of
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burglarious instruments, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of an alcoholic
container in a vehicle. (No. 47001 R., 1 pp.43--45.) The same month, Mr. Studer pled guilty to
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Aug. R., pp.13.) Mr. Studer was released on bond. (See No. 47001 R., p.5 (register of actions).) Mr. Studer
then failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, set for August 2016. (No. 47001 R., p.57.)
In November 2016, in a new case, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging
Mr. Studer committed the crime of introduction of contraband in a correctional facility. (No.
47002 R., pp.13-14.) Mr. Studer waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him
over to district court. (No. 47002 R., p.26.) The State filed an Information charging him with
introduction of contraband, and Mr. Studer pled guilty as charged in December 2016. (No. 47002
R., pp.27-28, 36-37.)
In January 2017, the district court held a joint sentencing hearing for both cases. (No.
47002 R., pp.38-29.) For receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, the district court sentenced
Mr. Studer to five years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction (a "rider"). (No. 47001
R., pp.72-73.) For introduction of contraband, the district court imposed the same sentence, to be
served concurrently, and retained jurisdiction. (No. 47002 R., pp.40--41.)
In November 2017, the district court held a rider review hearing. (No. 47001 R., pp.7778; No. 47002 R., pp.45--46.) Mr. Studer successfully completed the rider program, and the
district court placed him on probation in both cases. (No. 47001 R., pp.79-81; No. 47002
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docket number.
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R., pp.47--48; see Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"),2 pp.1-6.) The district court also
dismissed the possession of paraphernalia charge. (No. 47001 R., p.78.)
Then, in March 2018, the State moved to revoke Mr. Studer's probation in both cases.
(No. 47001 R., pp.85-87, 88-91, 112-16; No. 47002 R., pp.50-52, 53-56, 75-79.) Eventually,
in September 2018, the State filed a second amended petition to revoke Mr. Studer's probation
for committing multiple new offenses in Ada and Canyon Counties. (No. 47001 R., pp.112-16;
No. 47002 R., pp.75-79.) In January 2019, Mr. Studer admitted to violating his probation for
committing the crimes of misdemeanor malicious injury to property, unlawful entry, and eight
counts of violating a no contact order. (Tr., p.6, L.12-p.8, L.25; No. 47001 R., pp.362-63; No.
47002 R., pp.327-28.) The district court proceeded directly to disposition. (Tr., p.8, L.25-p.9,
L.6.) The State argued for the district court to revoke probation and execute Mr. Studer's
sentences. (See Tr., p.10, L.5-p.13, L.22.) Mr. Studer informed the district court that, for his
Canyon County offenses, the district court retained jurisdiction, so he asked the court to retain
jurisdiction or continue the probation violation disposition until he completed the Canyon
County rider. (See Tr., p.14, L.5-p.17, L.23.) The district court agreed with the State and
revoked Mr. Studer's probation and executed his concurrent five-year sentences. (Tr., p.25,
Ls.8-22; No. 47001 R., pp.362-63, 364-65; No. 47002 R., pp.327-28, 329-30.)
In both cases, Mr. Studer moved for reconsideration under Rule 35. (No. 47001
R., pp.366, 368-76; No. 47002 R., pp.331, 333--41.) The district court issued an order denying
the motions. (No.47001 R., pp.378-81; No. 47002 R., pp.343--46.) Mr. Studer timely appealed.
(No. 47001 R., pp.383-84; No. 47002 R., pp.348--49.)
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Citations to the PSI refer to the eighty-seven-page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Studer's Rule 35 motions?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Studer's Rule 35 Motions
"A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court." State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must "consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence." Id. The
Court "conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). "Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35," the Court's scope of review "includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce." State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant

must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
Mindful of the fact that he had not satisfied Huffman's requirement for new or additional
information, Mr. Studer nevertheless, maintains that the district court did not exercise reason and
thus abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motions. As requested in his Rule 35 motions,
Mr. Studer submits that the district court should have placed him on probation, retained
jurisdiction, or reduced his fixed time to two years in order to make him parole eligible. (No.
47001 R., p.370; No. 47002 R., p.335.) He argues that the district court should have reduced his
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sentence in one of these three ways so he could "take advantage of the rider" in Canyon County.
(No. 47001 R., p.370; No. 47002 R., p.335.) As asserted by trial counsel:
First, with respect to the protection of society, the defendant's crimes
while originally charged as multiple count felonies, were all resolved as three
misdemeanor cases. The felony from Canyon County occurred prior to being
sentenced to the rider in the present case. He has clearly learned his lesson and
adjusted his conduct accordingly. He was sentenced to a rider from conduct that
occurred prior to being placed on probation after serving a rider in the present
case.
The defendant can benefit from additional in-custody programming to
further help him participate in society. If the Court decides to place him on
probation or a concurrent rider, he will be likely able to take advantage of the incustody programming. Such a sentence would not interfere with the sentence
imposed out of Canyon County. The more programming and skills that the
defendant can receive, the better he will be able to be a productive member of
society. The defendant could participate in society by finding gainful employment
and thereby generate not only a taxable income but also earn money that could be
put toward the fine, fees, and restitution that was previously ordered in this case.
(No. 47001 R., pp.372-73; No. 47002 R., pp.337-38.) Trial counsel also argued that, if
Mr. Studer's fixed time was reduced, protection of society would still be served because
Mr. Studer would be on the Canyon County rider. (No. 47001 R., p.373; No. 47002 R., p.338.)
After the rider, trial counsel explained, Mr. Studer would be supervised by probation and parole,
which would provide adequate protection for society as well. (No. 47001 R., pp.373-74; No.
47002 R., pp.338-39.) As for deterrence, Mr. Studer's counsel contended:
[T]he defendant has learned his lesson and is comparatively less likely to
commit additional crimes. The defendant may once again become a law-abiding,
productive member of society. The prosecution of this case, the sentencing
process, the imposition of a period of incarceration, the loss of employment
opportunities, the amount of fines and restitution that has been ordered, the
additional convictions which now appear on the defendant's record, the amount of
time that he has already spent in custody, the fact that a probation officer and a
parole officer will likely be involved in his life for approximately three years, and
the very real possibility that he could be returned to prison for even minor
transgressions of the terms and conditions of his probation are sufficient factors to
deter both this defendant and others .... Similarly, the defendant has already
served a significant period of time in custody. To a significant degree, deterrence
has already been achieved.
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(No. 47001 R., p.374; No. 47002 R., p.339.) Trial counsel also argued that the possibility of
Mr. Studer's rehabilitation was furthered by the Canyon County rider. (No. 47001 R., p.375; No.
47002 R., pp.339-40.) Finally, Mr. Studer's counsel argued that he had been "significantly
punished" by losing "his freedom, his job, many of his assets, and he will have to find new
employment as a [result of] having committed multiple felonies." (No. 47001 R., p.375; No.
47002 R., p.340.) His counsel also noted that Mr. Studer was separated from his family. (No.
47001 R., p.375; No. 47002 R., p.340.) In light of these arguments, but mindful of Huffman, Mr.
Studer maintains that the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motions.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Studer respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. In the alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate or reverse the
district court's orders denying his Rule 35 motions and remand both cases for a Rule 35 motion
hearing.
DATED this 15 th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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